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The Future of Taiwan
Introduction
In American media, Taiwan has been referred to as the potential flashpoint for the next world
war (“Taiwan”). Much quantitative research has been done regarding political views and
predictions for Taiwan’s future. Based on previous studies, this essay seeks to build more
knowledge on public perceptions of the Taiwan independence conflict among individuals on
either side of the Taiwan Strait through interview-based research methods. To do this, I
interviewed five individuals born in mainland China and five individuals born in Taiwan to
compare how they view issues surrounding the China-Taiwan relationship and Taiwan's political
status. My central research question looks at the differences between what individuals on
opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait think about Taiwan’s political status through the lens of
Taiwan’s history and the participants’ educational and personal background on China-Taiwan
relations.
This essay will be broken down into four main sections. First, Taiwan’s history, development,
and the purpose of this research will be clarified. Next, existing public opinion data will be
examined and evaluated. After that, both China’s recent escalations and the United States’ stake
in the two sides will be considered. The final section will discuss the structure and results of my
interviews.
The History of Taiwan
Taiwan first became known to the Western world in the early 1500s, when passing European
sailors referred to it as “Formosa” or “beautiful island” (“History”). Later on in 1624, the Dutch
East India Company established a trading port on the southwest region of the island, but loyalists
to the mainland Chinese Ming rulers took control of the entire island only forty years later in
1664. Despite being under Ming control, Taiwan was not officially declared a province of China
until the Qing dynasty in 1885 (“History”). This event is the original historical basis for
mainland China’s claim to ownership over the land rights to Taiwan. Taiwan would not remain a
Chinese province for very long though, with the loss of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895
forcing China’s cession of Taiwan to Japan (“History”). Japan ruled Taiwan as an imperial power
for fifty years, and later invaded mainland China , forcing its way down the East coast and
sacking cities on the way. While the Chinese may have organized to fight off the Japanese, it
took until the Allied victory over Japan in 1945 and the official conclusion of WWII to end the
Japanese occupation. After the victory, sovereignty of mainland China was restored, and Taiwan
was given back under control of China.
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The return of Taiwan to the Chinese government’s control in 1945 is where the real sovereignty
battle gets complicated. The official ruling party of China following WWII was the Guomindang
or GMD, a nationalist, capitalist government that was friendly with Western countries like the
US and its Allied European powers. Where the Guomindang was friendly to the West, however,
it was much less so to its own population. The Guomindang was established in 1925, a little over
a decade after the fall of China’s imperial system. The first party leader was Sun Yatsen, who
was known as a strong orator and established three basic principles for his leadership:
nationalism, democracy, and a form of egalitarianism that sought to equalize land and taxation.
After Sun died in 1925, however, he was succeeded by Jiang Jieshi (also referred to as Chiang
Kai-shek). Under Jiang, the GMD was characterized by corruption and nepotism, and was a rule
of the urban elites at a time where the vast majority of the country lived in rural areas and
worked in agriculture.
The Chinese Communist Party, or CCP, was established around the same time as the GMD, but
began as a secret group with a rural base of power and a military mindset. The CCP agreed to
join with the GMD multiple times with the multilateral goal of defeating Japan, but was betrayed
in 1927, when Jiang ordered the systematic slaughter of as many communists as possible, and
again in 1946, where the fragile WWII truce between the two parties broke with Jiang again
ordering the deaths of all communist forces. This break was extremely important, with the
resulting civil war between the two factions ending with the leaders of the GMD, the government
of the Republic of China (or ROC, for short), fleeing to the island of Taiwan alongside two
million of their supporters. Despite their numbers being decimated, the CCP’s promises of
widespread social change and freedom from imperialism coupled with the harsh life under the
GMD led to the CCP gaining the support of the agrarian masses, allowing them to win the war.
With the ROC government out of the way, the CCP officially established the People’s Republic
of China, or PRC, the China known today.
Over in Taiwan, the ROC picked right up where they left off on the mainland, imposing a system
of martial law on the native Taiwanese people who were only recently freed from Japanese
imperial rule. Despite the system of harsh rule, Taiwan began to develop quickly in terms of its
economy, thanks in part to a focus on export-led growth and foreign economic aid from the
United States (“Taiwan”), who, in the midst of the Cold War, was eager to protect a pro-Western
and economically liberal government strategically located near the newly established communist
stronghold that was mainland China. This protection was not just rhetorical, but also led to
legitimate military action during the two Taiwan Strait Crises.
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis arose in 1954 with fighting between ROC and PRC troops on a
pair of smaller islands off the coast of Taiwan. Seeing this aggression as a threat to US interests
in the area, the United States’ President Eisenhower signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan,

Hodge 3
leading Chinese forces to pursue negotiation (“Chronology”). The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
took place four years later in 1958 when Chinese forces began artillery fire on the same strategic
islands as before. In this situation, the US sent in military forces to defend Taiwan and the ROC
government. Again, the situation was resolved with Chinese forces halting their attack
(“Chronology”).
Even with these outside pressures, Taiwan’s economy developed quickly, allowing it to become
one of the “Asian Tigers”, which referred to the rapidly industrializing economies of Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Taiwan’s harsh system of martial law would continue
on until after the death of Jiang Jieshi. Jiang’s son and successor, Jiang Jingguo, set Taiwan on
the course of political democratization and went on to end the system of martial law before his
own death in 1987 (“Taiwan”).
Taiwan’s road to democracy was not easy, and problems arose with the changing government,
who at times worked to silence opposition parties with prison sentences and legal bans on
political organization. Eventually able to move past these challenges, Taiwan left behind the
system of choosing a successor and held its first free and democratic election in 1996, despite
intimidation tactics coming from mainland China’s missile tests on the day of the election
(“Taiwan”).
Taiwan today runs as a democratic election system with a free and fair election system. Despite
only being diplomatically recognized by less than twenty countries, Taiwan is a member of
international organizations like the World Trade Organization (but has not been allowed to rejoin
the United Nations, even with observer status). As it stands, China’s rise as a global power has
made it more likely that, barring involvement from other countries, an attempt to forcefully
reunify with Taiwan would be successful. Not only that, but Taiwan’s reunification is seen as a
continuing goal of the Chinese government. In recent years, however, a younger generation of
those who were born and raised as Taiwanese are creating a more progressive push towards the
independence of the island. The current leading party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive
Party, has openly acknowledged their belief that Taiwan is a sovereign nation, whether or not it
receives diplomatic recognition. For all intents and purposes, Taiwan operates with its own
executive, legislative body, laws, education system, etc., all separate from those of mainland
China. With continued tensions, though, the future of the island is uncertain.
Public Opinion in Modern Taiwan
Public opinion in Taiwan remains split on some issues, but a number of public opinion surveys
conducted in recent years show markedly progressive shifts in thought over recent years. A 2019
poll conducted by the Pew Research Center reports back on a variety of points regarding this
topic. In a question comparing how Taiwanese adults felt towards China and the United States,
68% of respondents reported having a favorable view of the United States, as opposed to only
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35% of respondents having a favorable view of mainland China (Devlin). In a question about
identity, 66% of respondents consider themselves to be only Taiwanese, compared with 28% who
see themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese. Those who see themselves as Taiwanese only
include 83% of respondents from ages 18-29 and an overwhelming 92% of respondents who
identify as supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (Devlin). This proportion is telling for
Taiwan’s future: with an increasingly progressive younger generation and a leading power who
shares their views of Taiwan’s political status, a peaceful reunification seems to be less and less
likely.
The statistic mentioned above regarding 92% of DPP respondents identifying only as Taiwanese
may seem representative of a nation’s ideals, but such is not the case. Unlike the strictly
two-party system of power in the United States, Taiwan has dozens of political parties that
regularly win seats within their legislative body. In fact, the 2020 Taiwan National Security
Survey (the TNSS) reports that 40.7% of Taiwanese citizens do not identify with any political
party (Hickey). The party with the most support last year was the DPP, with 29% (Hickey). The
second largest party is the Guomindang, with the support of 19% of the population (Hickey). The
Guomindang of today is descended from the original founders of modern Taiwan’s government,
and have varying views on the potential future. On one hand, the Guomindang party stance
naturally remains more conservative than that of the DPP, and retains the conviction that
eventually Taiwan and China will unify. At the same time, however, for many years after the
ROC/GMD government was set up in Taiwan, they continued to claim that all the lands of
Taiwan, all of mainland China, Mongolia, Tibet, and the Diaoyu Islands (which are under Japan’s
control) are a part of the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China (U.S. Relations).
While this claim is still contained in the GMD constitution, it is not an active consideration or
pursuit of Taiwan, and there have in fact been discussions about removing this particular tenet
(U.S. Relations). Regardless of the GMD’s shift in stance, it is fair to say that the GMD’s vision
of reunification may differ from that of the PRC and its Chinese Communist Party leaders.
The reasoning behind the increasingly progressive nature of the Taiwanese population can be
brought back to a few different reasons. The most obvious is that the younger generation of
Taiwanese citizens do not have the same connection to mainland China as their predecessors.
Going back to the point about identity, individuals born and raised in Taiwan in the past few
decades likely have no context for being a distinctly Chinese citizen, as is apparent in the survey
data gathered.
Another important reason behind this shift in perspective is the situation in Hong Kong,
particularly how it has illuminated the problems with the “One Country, Two Systems” model of
governance. The original proposition for this system was that mainland China would be the
leader and maintain its socialist system, but that the other territories under China’s control could
continue to operate under capitalist systems. This system is currently working moderately well in
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Macau, but less so in Hong Kong. Hong Kong, a former British colony, returned under Chinese
rule in 1997 with the promise of the One Country, Two Systems methodology. The view of many
in Hong Kong, however, is that mainland China is overstepping and encroaching on the liberties
enjoyed by Hong Kong’s residents (Overholt). This has taken many forms, such as censorship
and loss of publishing freedom, control of Hong Kong businesses, and ‘security laws’
(Overholt). Numerous protest movements have gone on in Hong Kong in the past decade or so as
a result, but there is little likelihood for change.
In terms of Taiwan, the overstepping into internal affairs has led to a wholesale rejection of the
One Country, Two System proposition not only by the DPP and President Cai Yingwen, but also
by the typically China-friendly GMD (Grossman). Chinese leaders originally believed that the
Hong Kong transition would serve as the model to lead to Taiwan’s return to China’s sphere of
influence, but it has in fact done the opposite (Overholt).
Escalating Tensions and the Role of the United States
The United States plays a pivotal role in the conflicts between Taiwan and China. One major
reason Taiwan retains sovereignty today is the United States’ interventions in conflicts against
mainland China, and continues to foster a robust unofficial relationship with Taiwan today. The
United States government does not recognize Taiwan as an independent country, and has
acknowledged the PRC stance that there is only one China, and Taiwan is part of China (U.S
Relations). Despite no official diplomatic recognition, the United States does commit to helping
Taiwan maintain their defense capabilities, and explicitly states on the State Department Taiwan
fact sheet that the US opposes any type of unilateral change to the status quo from either side,
instead encouraging constructive dialogue and respect for all future relations (U.S. Relations).
Using a method known as strategic ambiguity, the United States has deliberately not publicized
its stance towards China and Taiwan. What this means is that the US makes no claims as to
whether or not it would defend Taiwan militarily should mainland China attempt to forcefully
unify the two sides. There are some factors that may contribute to either response. On one hand,
the United States has used their military to defend Taiwan in the past. In both Taiwan Strait
Crises, the United States Navy was an integral factor in defending Taiwan. Additionally, the
United States' so-called commitment to helping Taiwan's defense has also taken the form of
expensive arms sales to Taiwan. On the other hand, China today has political, economic, and
military capabilities unlike what the United States faced throughout the Taiwan Strait Crises, and
any war between the two would not only be catastrophic militarily speaking, but also
economically. The global economy today is highly integrated due to globalization, and it is
difficult to judge just how damaging a conflict would be to the world economy, let alone what
would happen if other countries are forced to choose sides. Perhaps the most important modern
factor is nuclear proliferation. The last time the US and China faced off, whether officially with
US-back United Nations forces facing Chinese-backed North Korean army at the end of the
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Korean War or unofficially in the Taiwan Strait Crisis, only the United States had reached
nuclear capabilities. With both sides highly nuclearized, the damage of a true war is
unimaginable.
While strategic ambiguity is the way of both the past and officially the method of the present
administration, recent slip-ups from President Biden suggest otherwise. When asked about
defending Taiwan from military invasion, Biden reportedly agreed that the US has a commitment
to Taiwan (“Yes”). While his statement has been modified by official White House
announcements which maintain that the US position towards Taiwan remains the same, it does
give some insight on the stance of the current administration.
In Taiwan, opinions on potential military conflict with mainland China have been deciphered
through surveying. The Diplomat reports on one survey in particular in which the majority of
Taiwanese respondents, more than 60%, believe that Taiwan would not be able to defend itself
successfully against an attack by Mainland China (Kafura). In 2020 however, 53% of survey
respondents indicate that they expect the United States to intervene and commit troops to a
conflict against mainland China.
As it stands in the United States, surveys report that the majority of Americans, 69% to be exact,
support formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent country (Kafura). This survey, reported
by the Chicago Council, also states that 53% of Americans are in favor of a formal alliance of
Taiwan, and a plurality of 46% of Americans support ending the United States strategy of
strategic ambiguity and giving an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan from Chinese invasion
(Kafura). There are two main perspectives that lead to these relatively high numbers. One side is
that many Americans see Taiwan as a friend and an important trading ally, especially in terms of
obtaining technology like computer chips that are difficult to produce. On the flip side, many
Americans support Taiwan because they see China as an adversary of the U.S. and wish to
counteract China’s rise and the potential creation of a sphere of influence in the South China Sea.
Either way, the United States government outwardly has not put forth a definitive strategy.
In coming years, strategic ambiguity may not be so simple. More recently, China has ramped up
aggression towards China. This past October, China celebrated National Day. Throughout the
week of the events, a total of one-hundred and fifty Chinese air force planes flew into Taiwan’s
Air Defense Identification Zone (Hioe). Some see this as a symbolic show of strength on the part
of China, especially in recognition of the official founding of the People’s Republic of China, but
others have proposed that these airspace encroachments are being used to prod Taiwan’s
defenses, search for weak points, and evaluate Taiwan’s responses (Hioe). It is likely that both of
these explanations are true. The US is not opposed to responding to such shows of strength
either, as a US warship passed through the Taiwan Strait soon after the November talks between
President Biden and President Xi, the eleventh such time this year (US Warship).
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Interview Results
All interviews in this study were conducted in Mandarin under the condition of anonymity, with
five respondents from mainland China and five from Taiwan. For the sake of clarity, the
interviewees from mainland China will heretofore be referred to as Respondents One-Five and
the interviewees from Taiwan will be referred to as Respondents A-E. The original interviews
with the mainland Chinese respondents were carried out as part of a separate project, and
responses are thus less structured, rising naturally out of conversation. The Taiwanese
respondents were asked more focused questions.
Respondent One supports unification. When asked their specific thoughts about reunification,
Respondent One described the scenario with Taiwan as a child who has gone off on their own,
but will one day return home to its mother, China. Respondent One described the cultural and
economic situation between the countries, and also the issues relating to celebrity identity.
Because of the much larger consumer market than in Taiwan, many Taiwanese singers and actors
will attempt to make a living in mainland China. To do so, many of them outwardly identify
themselves as Chinese. When the conversation broached the topic of why Taiwan is becoming
seemingly more progressive despite economic interconnectedness, Respondent One pointed to
the Taiwanese education system, saying that Taiwan is using independence-teachings in its
curriculum, leading many young people to grow up with the belief that Taiwan is and should be
recognized as an independent nation. This may be an important contributing factor in increasing
progressiveness, but it was an ironic observation considering mainland China is also known to
engage in the same type of patriotic education, in which it teaches that Taiwan is an indivisible
part of China. Beyond the education system, Respondent One believes that there are differing
opinions within Taiwan, and that there is a large population in Taiwan that still believes in
unification. Respondent One pointed out social barriers to expressing differing thoughts, in
particular among young people, when there is a louder majority very much in favor of an
independent Taiwan. There is likely some truth to this statement. Taiwan’s second term
president, Cai Yingwen, ran primarily on the basis on Taiwanese independence and standing up
for Taiwanese sovereignty against mainland China. She won 57.1% of the popular vote (Hickey),
which suggests that up to 43% of Taiwanese people either do not feel strongly about
independence, or oppose the message completely. Respondent One sees the current
Taiwan-China relation as an issue that the entire global system has a stake in, and believes that
regardless of what the future entails in terms of unification, a harmonious settlement is essential.
Respondent Two also is a supporter of unification. In their opinion, historical precedents and
modern reasonings are both important. Respondent Two discussed Taiwan’s rule by emperors
hundreds of years ago, and when Taiwan was finally returned after Japan’s loss in World War II,
control of the island went to the rightful leaders of mainland China, which the CCP and the
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People’s Republic of China government asserted itself to be following its 1949 victory in the
Chinese civil war. At the same time as they agree that Taiwan is a part of China, Respondent
Two also talks about the changing views towards Taiwan from the perspective of mainlanders.
Years ago, Taiwan was considered a “treasure island”, and people on the mainland were eager to
have contact with people in Taiwan. Now that China is also a highly advanced economy,
Taiwan’s industry is no longer as important. According to Respondent Two, the most useful
industry in Taiwan is the semiconductor industry, but otherwise China does not have too much to
gain economically from Taiwan. Despite this, Respondent Two believes that the strategic
location of Taiwan is integral to China, and controlling the land rights is more important than
assuming governance over the actual people living in Taiwan. In fact, Respondent Two went as
far as to say that Taiwanese people who did not want to live as part of China were welcome to
relocate elsewhere and immigrate to another country. Even so, Respondent Two echoed the
beliefs of Respondent One that a peaceful solution is the best option. At the same time, however,
they pointed to the effects of the epidemic and beliefs that Taiwan withheld PPE from mainland
China instead of coming to their assistance, which has put even more tension on the relations
between the two countries. For this reason, they assert that more people in the mainland are
seeing the possibility of a hostile unification. In summary, Respondent Two said simply that they
believe the people of mainland China will never support Taiwanese independence, and moreover
do not like the government of Taiwan.
Respondent Three has a different view than the other mainlanders. While hesitant to take a clear
stance on the issue, Respondent Three provided insights on how their own education impacted
beliefs about Taiwan. Like the others, Respondent Three grew up in mainland China and was
taught that Taiwan is an indivisible part of China. After coming to the United States, however,
they were able to see opinions written by Taiwanese writers and citizens for the first time, which
provided a different perspective. Respondent Three also provided an analogy to explain their
experience, saying that it is like when your parent warns their child not to spend time with
certain people, either because of their background or reputation, but then the child decides to
meet them anyway, only to realizes that reality is much different from what they have been told.
Now Respondent Three considers themself to be more like a judge, hearing both sides of the case
before forming an opinion. Still, they would not take a stance on whether or not Taiwan was
independent for the reason that they themselves are not Taiwanese, and think it is wrong to
decide for someone else. That being said, Respondent Three emphasized the difference between
politicians and people. Politicians do not necessarily represent the exact opinions of their people,
and tend to have goals that have impacts beyond the interests and motivations of everyday
citizens. In speaking about American influence in Taiwan, Respondent Three believes that
although the United States has supported Taiwan in the past, especially economically, there is no
guarantee that it will come to Taiwan’s aid in a military conflict. At the end of the day, the US
will do what is in its own best interests.
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Respondent Four focused a lot on the differences in the opinions and ways of life among
Taiwanese people. In terms of their own education, Respondent Four was also taught that Taiwan
was a part of China, both historically and in the future. In life, however, Respondent Four had
multiple opportunities to visit Taiwan for work, and was able to experience life there.
Respondent Four pointed out some of the generational differences in opinion about Taiwan. For
the children of the older generation who escaped to Taiwan with the ROC, China is still
considered their long lost home. Young people lack this type of connection to mainland China.
Like Respondent Three, Respondent Four also differentiates between politics and people, and
notes that one reason many people oppose unification is because of the impact they see it having
on their own day-to-day lives. As Respondent Four notes, people in Taiwan enjoy not only more
political freedoms than those in mainland China, but they are also highly connected through the
internet and services like Facebook and Youtube that are blocked in China. This is a very
interesting point, and ties back to the effect that breakdown in freedoms like expression and press
in Hong Kong have on people’s choices, perhaps contributing to why Taiwanese citizens
continue to vote for the DPP government and the independence movement. In terms of
Taiwanese independence itself, Respondent Four believes that Taiwanese people should have the
right to choose and to freely discuss their thoughts.
Respondent Five, the final mainland interviewee, is somewhere in between the traditional beliefs
of Respondents One and Two and the more open ideas of Respondents Three and Four.
Respondent Five discussed the widest range of topics among the mainland interviewees. In terms
of their education, Respondent Five also learned that from a historical perspective, Taiwan is part
of China. Important notes are not only from distant history, but also more recent history made
with the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus that Respondent Five is referring to is an
“agreement” reached by representatives of the CCP and the GMD in 1992 (Maizland). The word
agreement is in quotations here because the actual takeaway from this consensus has two very
different interpretations. What the CCP government of the People’s Republic of China believes is
that this 1992 Consensus represents Taiwan’s agreement that there is only one China, and that
unification will eventually be pursued in the future (Maizland). What the GMD believed itself to
be agreeing to was that there is one China, but that the single China is the ROC (Maizland).
Because of such contentions in meaning, President Cai has not formally acknowledged the
content of the 1992 Consensus (Maizland), another factor contributing to tensions in
China-Taiwan relations. Beyond the formal and historical precedents discussed, Respondent Five
also has personal experience in Taiwan. Whereas Respondent Four’s experience of China
allowed them to gain an appreciation for Taiwan, Respondent Five’s experience was not so
positive. Studying for half a year as a part of their masters program, Respondent Five discussed
feeling marginalized and bullied by certain Taiwanese students because she was from the
mainland. Even so, Respondent Five’s main hope for the future is that Taiwan works to maintain
the status quo. In their opinion, a formal independence declaration will lead to war, which
everyone agrees is a terrible solution.
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I will next be examining the five interviews with respondents A-E from Taiwan. As mentioned
above, the interview questions for this section are more structured than above, but similar topics
were discussed.
Respondent A’s answers reflected the difference in opinions between the older and younger
generations in Taiwan. Echoing the point made by Respondent One, Respondent A recalls that
the textbooks in school growing up teach about Taiwanese sovereignty and independence,
focusing on Taiwan’s separate territory and government. In terms of China’s motivations for
unification, Respondent A points to the cultural similarity, the fact that both mainland Chinese
and Taiwanese people are all “hua-ren” which refers to being Chinese not just in the political
sense, but ethnically speaking. In talking about mainstream views among Taiwanese people
about independence, Respondent A makes a clear distinction between the younger and older
generations. Younger people mainly believe that Taiwan is Taiwan, not a part of China, and
therefore do not like the idea of unifying with mainland China. For older generations however,
the recurring theme arises yet again. Respondent A’s grandfather came from China, and has
always dreamed of returning to the mainland, a fact that Respondent A believes her father agrees
with. At the same time, their mother’s side of the family has lived in Taiwan for generations,
giving them a view of both sides of this perspective. When asked how they would handle
relations with mainland China, Respondent A recalled their own experience visiting the United
States. Like mainland Respondents Three and Four, Respondent A’s viewpoint was also altered
by experience in the United States. They noted that it was very easy to view mainlanders as the
enemy of Taiwan, but coming to the US where there is no real distinction between Taiwanese
and Chinese individuals gave them the chance to chat about these issues and decide that working
together to make progress is the best option. That being said, Respondent A is not proposing
unification, and was not optimistic that Taiwan will retain sovereignty when asked what their
thirty-year future prediction for Taiwan is. In terms of the US complication, Respondent A
believes that the US’ friendly relationship with the DPP has a large influence on Taiwan’s
military, especially their navy. Even so, Respondent A sees Taiwanese individuals’ opinions on
the US as yet again split by age, with younger generations more likely to feel positive about the
US and older generations more likely to see the US as being out for its own gain, an observation
consistent with the Pew Research Polls cited earlier on in this report.
Respondent B was the most outwardly in favor of Taiwanese independence. When asked about
their view on current China-Taiwan relations, they responded that China and the CCP are
suppressing Taiwan’s political abilities, like by blocking them from meaningful participation in
international organizations like the United Nations and World Health Organization. Despite this,
Respondent B feels that China and Taiwan can get along very well when not discussing issues
relating to politics. Respondent B points to the strategic position of Taiwan as the main reason
for China’s pursuit of unification. Personally, Respondent B reports that they are in support of
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Taiwan’s independence, but thinks that believing in the two country model is enough, so the
country-wide protests and marches to assert these ideas are not necessary. Despite a strong belief
in independence, Respondent B is as pessimistic as Respondent A in regards to Taiwan’s future,
also responding that they believe unification is an unavoidable future and that Taiwan will need
to accept this future to survive. When speaking on the role of the United States, Respondent B
reported that they believe the US is the main reason why China has not invaded Taiwan as of yet,
and sees the US as an important piece in determining Taiwan’s future.
Respondent C has a pragmatic view on relations between China and Taiwan. In their opinion,
Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country with its own president, government, and decision
making capability. The only thing missing is recognition from the rest of the world, which is out
of Taiwan’s control. Respondent C believes that the main reasons for the mainland’s pursuit of
unification are Taiwan’s strategic location in regards to trade, and because of the historical sense
of pride associated with reclaiming Taiwan. Personally, Respondent C acknowledges that the
cultures in Taiwan and China are nearly the same, but notes that the different governing
structures are very important to remember in thinking about unification. Like Respondents A and
B, Respondent C also discussed the effects of age and family history on opinions towards
independence. When asked about how they would handle China-Taiwan conflicts, Respondent C
recalled their participation in the Sunflower Movement a few years ago in Taiwan, which was a
series of nationwide protests calling for the review of free trade agreements with mainland China
(Ho). Respondent C referred to Taiwan’s economic reliance on trade with the mainland, and
believes that opposing such deals is a wise decision for Taiwan’s future. Speaking of said future,
Respondent C was very unsure about what is in store for Taiwan. In the past, there was an
expectation among many Taiwanese that the Western world would step in to help against an
invasion from mainland China. According to Respondent C, this perception has changed in
recent years. With the decline of freedoms in Hong Kong and no real response from countries
like the UK, France, or the US, the belief in meaningful protection from China is decreasing. At
the same time, however, Respondent C maintains the belief that the US may still choose to
intervene in favor of Taiwan, albeit for its own interests. In this way, Taiwan is referred to as the
United States’ “bargaining chip,” leading to mixed feelings among the Taiwanese towards the
US.
Respondent D was the most politically undecided of the Taiwanese interviewees, but even then
still pointed out that Taiwan has its own government and constitution. Speaking about unification
reasons, Respondent D agreed with both Respondents B and C that Taiwan’s strategic
positioning in the Taiwan Strait was a primary motivation, but went on to add that Chinese
nationalism is also a contributing factor. When talking about the opinions of Taiwanese
individuals, Respondent D reported that they personally felt no strong connection to either the
independence-seeking DPP or the eventual unification supporting GMD, and that their parents
also do not have a political affiliation. This fits with the results reported above for the Taiwan
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National Security Survey. Rather than supporting a specific party stance, Respondent D merely
wants to pursue a peaceful future and avoid any type of conflict. Looking ahead to Taiwan’s
future, Respondent D just hopes for the health of their family and friends and the survival of
freedom of speech and freedom of press in Taiwan. Respondent D sees the US as a friend of
Taiwan and an influential world power, but is troubled by the lack of international participation
available for Taiwan, particularly in the World Health Organization in the midst of a global
pandemic. Respondent D’s point about the WHO was very poignant. Taiwan is recognized for
having one of the most comprehensive and successful responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, and
yet continues to be denied entry into the World Health Organization due to pressures from China.
This is understandably frustrating, especially because the WHO is clearly focused not on
political issues, but on public health.
Respondent E believes that the relationship between China and Taiwan is antagonistic, especially
between CCP and DPP leaders. In terms of people, Respondent E thinks the relationship is
relatively good, but politically there are many problems. Based on their own education and
personal beliefs, Respondent E agrees that Taiwan is Taiwan, not a part of China, but recognizes
that discussing Taiwan’s national identity is a difficult and contentious issue. According to
Respondent E, historical and cultural reasons are the main motivators for mainland China’s
pursuit of unification, but Taiwanese citizens have developed their own government and history,
and do not wish to return to China’s control. Even so, Respondent E wishes to maintain Taiwan’s
current status operating in the gray areas, rather than stirring a hostile rivalry with mainland
China. Even so, Respondent E thinks Taiwan should be able to pursue its own identity in the
future, especially on the global stage. When it comes to US influence on the China-Taiwan
relation, Respondent E is conflicted. On one hand, they see the US and Taiwan as similar
regional democracies and know that the US could be the one to speak up for Taiwan and help
negotiate with China. They report that most people in Taiwan like the US, especially in terms of
visiting the US or buying US-brand products. Respondent E also has respect for the transparency
of media in the US, even when the conflict at hand has to do with the government, saying that in
Taiwan media can be very biased against mainland China and their government. On the other
hand, Respondent E agrees with the other Taiwanese respondents on the point that the US will
always keep its own interests in mind over Taiwan’s, and thus may act differently than expected
in a conflict.

Conclusion
The five mainland Chinese respondents represent a broad range of opinions. From Respondent
Two in favor of unification regardless of what to Taiwanese people choose to Respondent Four
who believes Taiwan should choose its own future, all sides are represented. It is important to
note here, however, that a sample where two support unification, two support Taiwan’s choice,
and one is in favor of pursuing the status quo is likely not representative of mainland China as a
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whole. I was able to interview each person because I met them all as Chinese teachers, meaning
that each has the perspective of either living in the United States or working with American
students to teach Chinese to English-speakers. Not only that, but working in the United States
gives access to different sources of information and greater ability to be vocal about opinions
than may be possible in mainland China.
The Taiwanese respondents had some similar characteristics between their answers. Each of
them acknowledged Taiwan’s changing demographics as a major reason why people are
becoming more progressive, and agreed with mainland Respondent One that Taiwan has pursued
a patriotic education system that teaches independence. With generations of those who originally
fled China growing old, the new generation is making their own history and lacks a meaningful
personal connection that would spur them towards desiring unification with what can be seen as
a foreign country.
One interesting takeaway is the differences in perceived motivations of mainland China for
seeking unification. Many of the mainland Chinese respondents agreed that historical precedent
and land rights were the most important reason. While some of the Taiwanese respondents noted
cultural similarities, most of them mentioned Taiwan’s strategic location in the South China Sea
as being the main reason for pursuit of unification.
Something else to call attention to is found in the answers of Respondents Three and Four from
the mainland and B from Taiwan: the impact of leaving home on their opinion. This stance was
not surprising from the mainland Chinese interviewees, as China is widely known for its great
firewall and the inability to find information not explicitly approved by the government. For
them to come to either the United States or Taiwan itself and have their minds changed by the
availability of new information made a lot of sense. Respondent B’s answer was more
unexpected though. They talked about how Taiwan’s media and governing party villainize the
mainland government, and that if she had never had the chance to come to the US and meet
people from mainland China it would have been so easy to see them as their enemy. Coming to
the US, where both Chinese and Taiwanese individuals are put by society into the same minority
category gave Respondent B more perspective and a greater desire to work together with those
on the other side of the Strait.
The overwhelming agreement between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese respondents alike was
this: the hope for a peaceful resolution to their differences. For some, this meant allowing Taiwan
to be sovereign and independent, and for others the best method to ensure this result was by
sticking to an ambiguous status quo. This solution unfortunately may not be attainable. Chinese
President Xi Jinping has commented that reunification is necessary, and that ideally this will be
done through peaceful means. At the same time, however, China has not ruled out using force to
reach their goals, and is increasing military aggression towards Taiwan (Maizland). While
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Taiwan’s government may believe itself independent, it also wants to avoid a violent conflict to
assert this stance. In the words of President Cai, “Taiwan does not seek military confrontation. It
hopes for peaceful, stable, predictable, and mutually beneficial coexistence with its neighbors.
But if its democracy and way of life are threatened, Taiwan will do whatever it takes to defend
itself” (Ing-Wen). Both sides of the Strait are set on their goals for the future, and both are
preparing to achieve their goals by any means possible. I asked the Taiwanese respondents their
predictions for Taiwan in thirty-years, but with the rising tensions on both sides there is a greater
and greater chance that we will not have to wait that long to see the outcome of this conflict.
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Appendix: Interview Questions (Taiwanese Respondents A-E)
1. In your opinion, what is the current political status of Taiwan, and how would you
describe the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China?
a. 对您的教育来说，台湾现在的政治地位是什么？您如何描述中国大陆与台湾
的关系？
2. What do you think China’s main reason for pursuing unification is?
a. 您认为大陆追求跟台外统一的主要原因是什么？
3. In your opinion, what is the mainstream view on this issue among the public in Taiwan?
a. 在您看来，台湾民众对这个问题的看法是什么？
4. How do you think your view differs from the mainstream view?
a. 您觉得您的观点与主流的观点如何不同？
5. If you were in charge of Taiwan’s government, how would you handle diplomatic
relations with mainland China?
a. 如果您是台湾的领导，怎么处理与中国大陆的外交关系？
6. What is your prediction on what may happen to Taiwan in 30 years?
a. 您对三十年以后的台湾法身的事情有什么预测？
7. What roles does the US play in the China-Taiwan relationship?
a. 美国在中塔关系内有什么影响？
8. How is the US perceived among the public in Taiwan?
a. 台湾人对美国有什么看法？

